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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the study is to assess which factors influence the policymaking 
decisions to financially support an innovative investment project. Based on 
the case study of the Portuguese Innovation Incentive System in the Alentejo 
region, we estimated an econometric model based on firms’ and application’ 
characteristics, controlling for macroeconomic environment. The results 
indicate that the selection process is more focused on the expected project 
impact than on firms’ past performance. Furthermore, we found that 
government preference for promoting employment and exportation are shown 
to be higher than the impact on firm productivity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The EU strategy ‘Europe 2020’ has set a main target to create smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth, where innovation is considered the main 
economic driver for economic growth and creation of jobs, already since the 
Lisbon Agenda (Council of the European Union, 2000). The financial 
instruments of Cohesion Policy were designed in order to remove barriers to 
innovation within the EU. Public policies to support entrepreneurship and 
innovation play a vital role when firms have difficulties in accessing finance. 
In the presence of market failings, public support for Research & Development 
& Innovation (RDI) aims to fill financial gap, in order to improve knowledge 
production and come it as close as possible to the socially optimal level. To 
achieve the goal, governments give special attention to increasing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of innovation policy instruments. Nevertheless, 
the literature highlights some difficulties with public support directed at 
subsidized firms that are less efficient than non-subsidized firms (e.g. Bernini 
and Pellegrini, 2011; Jorge and Suárez, 2011). For example, Bernini and 
Pellegrini (2011) found that subsidized firms tend to show lower productivity 
growth than non-subsidized firms because firms are induced to reach their 
optimal level of employment (balance between input and output) in order to 
obtain the subsidy. In this case, the inefficiency of subsidized firms could lead 
to ineffectiveness of public funds in the long-run (difficulty to achieve policy 
goal). So, could this ineffectiveness to be linked to the selection process for 
awarding public support? 
The aim of the present contribution is to explain which factors influence the 
public decision to financially support innovative projects and to identify if the 
selection process was effective or not. The analysis is based on the case study 
of the Portuguese Innovation Incentive System (PIIS) and on the applications 
managed by the Alentejo Regional Operational Program in the period 2007 – 
2013. The PIIS is an instrument that was part of the Portuguese National 
Strategic Reference Framework (2007 – 2013) and was funded by the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The Portuguese Alentejo region was 
considered as a European region (NUTS-2 level) belonging to the Convergence 
Regions group, due to its major structural problems. 
The results of this study provide an understanding of policy decision directed 
at improving innovation investment and employment which may have long 
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term implications for productivity growth – the real driver of living standards. 
At the end, we will be able to identify if the failure highlighted by other 
authors could be in the upstream of public policy implementation process. 
Recommendations and conclusions could be useful beyond programs funded by 
ERDF to include all CP funds, since for the period 2014-2020 the same rules of 
management and control are applied also to the ESF. 
BACKGROUND THEORY 
Several determinants affect the probability of receiving an R&D subsidy. 
Previous studies (e.g. Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002; Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008; 
González and Pazó, 2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento, 2011; Hud and 
Hussinger, 2015) identify age, size of the firm, previous experience of 
receiving subsidies, the qualification of human capital, patent stock, past R&D 
activities and export intensity as determinants of subsidy provision. In 
general, government tends to select firms that are already best performers 
(e.g. higher level of exportation, patent stock, skilled job and R&D activities), 
based on “picking the winner” principle. This choice could be justified with 
the aim maximize potential outcomes in funded firms to easily achieve policy 
goals. 
Bearing in mind this assumption, we expect a certain government preference 
for firms with a specific profile – higher probability of successful project (e.g. 
higher survival rate and growth of profitability). 
The selection process of PIIS is based on four main criteria: i) Quality of the 
project; ii) Impact of project in company's competitiveness; iii) Contribution 
of the project to national competitiveness; iv) Contribution of the project to 
regional competitiveness and territorial economic cohesion. Within these 
fields, we can highlight the followings dimensions in the regulation of the PIIS: 
increase of productivity, representativeness in the international market, 
exploitation of R&D results, and creation of highly skilled job, wealth and 
employment in the region. In the model developed, we include all the 
mentioned variables and also others used by banks when assessing credit risk, 
namely the return on equity and the solvency ratio of applicant firms (e.g. 
Chaibi and Ftiti, 2015), in order to control for the effectiveness of PIIS in 
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counteracting debt and equity financing constraints. Indeed, firms with 
historically lower levels of these indicators are less attractive for new 
investors or banks because they show lower performance and more financial 
vulnerability. 
Macroeconomic factors in the year of submitting the application, measured by 
the regional GDP variation and the value of Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered 
Rate) are also taken into account with the aim of controlling for external 
factors which affect SMEs’ access to finance and growth. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The dataset was built with cross-information from ‘Information System of the 
National Strategic Reference Framework Incentive Scheme’ and statistical 
data from official entities (e.g. Portuguese National Institute of Statistics and 
PORDATA database). 
The sample has 451 observations, which correspond to the total number of 
applications submitted to PIIS by firms located in the Alentejo region and near 
to 8% of total applications to the program. The approval rate is 48%. The total 
amount of investment approved was 660 million euros associated with 306 
million euros of subsidized loans. More than 66% of applications were 
submitted by micro-sized enterprises. Applications for industry sector1 and 
tourism activities account for nearly 70% of the observations. Approved 
applications, compared with non-approved ones, foresee a higher amount of 
investment and a higher increase in total employees, skilled jobs and number 
of patents. Having experience in the PIIS procedures and past enrolment in 
R&D activities is also higher in the group with applications approved. 
Approved applications have a higher export intensity after project 
implementation however, a lower increase of productivity, compared to non-
approved ones. 
Using an econometric model (for more details see Appendix 1) the study aims 
to determine which factors influenced the probability of obtaining public 
                                         
1 Industry sector includes all types of manufacturing industries (low and high 
tech). 
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support for an innovative investment. The explanatory variables are 
categorized into three main groups:  
i) Firms’ characteristics:  
- Size, measured by number of employees; 
- Activity sector (Industry, Tourism, Services, Trade and Other sectors); 
- Financial performance and risk level, measured by the Solvability ratio 
(equity/debt);  
- Return on Equity ratio (net income/equity); 
- Experience in R&D activities: has the company a history of R&D 
activities in the year before the application submission (i.e. with a 
previous positive spending on R&D)? 
- Experience in the Portuguese Innovation Incentive System procedure: 
has the company submitted an application to the Innovation Incentive 
System before this one? 
ii) Project or application’s characteristics: 
- Amount of investment foreseen in the application form; 
- Expected impact: variation of patent number foreseen; export intensity 
(exportation/total turnover) foreseen; variation of skilled jobs 
number2; variation of productivity (variation of net income/variation of 
job) foreseen; 
iii) Cyclical factors: 
- Euribor 12 months in the year of application submission; 
- GDP variation in the region (NUTS 3 level) of project implementation in 
the year of application submission (Alentejo NUTS 2 is divided in four 
NUTS 3 regions). 
                                         
2 Under the program regulation, a highly qualified worker is a person with at least a 
post-secondary pre-tertiary level of education 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results (see Appendix 2) indicate that the selection process is more 
focused on the expected project impact than on firms’ past performance. 
Factors that influence the credit risk and the decision to give a bank loan, 
such as solvability ratio and return on equity, seem not to influence the 
government evaluator in funding some projects. Nor does previous experience 
in R&D activities seem to matter. Indeed, the selection process of PIIS 
appears to give preference to companies that foresee an increase of patent 
portfolio (successful innovation) over those showing past R&D activities. 
The variation of patent numbers and the variation of skilled jobs, as the result 
of the investment project, show a positive impact on the probability of 
receiving the public incentive, but at a higher level the effect tends to 
inverse and the probability of having an application selected decreases. One 
justification for this trend could be that projects with a higher number of 
additional patents in the short-term could be riskier and consequently have a 
higher risk of failure. Indeed, the process of patent registration could be hard 
and long. Then again, to hire a high number of new skilled workers could also 
be riskier because it requires a larger additional income in order to justify this 
and to make new jobs profitable. 
The variation in productivity shows a slightly negative impact, which means 
that having a project funded is linked to a low expected increase in 
productivity. At this stage, we do not know the real return of investment; 
however, if it materializes, this finding could suggest a long-term inefficiency 
in funded firms, as other authors also found based on real returns (Bernini and 
Pellegrini, 2011; Jorge and Suárez, 2011). One possible explanation for our 
result could be that in the selection process increased employment has 
priority over increased net income. However, on the other hand, projects 
with high growth rates may also be too ambitious and sometimes unrealistic in 
terms of execution, in a country and region affected by the economic and 
financial crisis, namely between 2009 and 2013. 
The export intensity ratio after project implementation shows a positive 
impact on the probability of having an application funded, as expected 
according to the scientific literature (cf. Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008; 
Czarnitzki and Lopes Bento 2011). Indeed, one goal of the program is to boost 
firms’ presence in international markets. 
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The amount of investment has a positive impact on the probability of being 
funded. If we take into account that, first, the amount of investment 
represents the sum of public incentive (percentage of the eligible investment) 
and private expenditure (equal to the remainder) and, second, the aim of the 
program is to stimulate innovative investment, it is expected that government 
will tend to approve applications with a higher amount of expenditure 
because this implies a greater private effort. Indeed, Santos et al. (2016) 
found that the amount of funded investment has a positive impact on the 
probability of firm survival because higher investments tend to be better 
planned. Because they are riskier, they need a higher additional cash-flow to 
be economically viable. So when governments choose to fund projects with 
a higher amount of investment, this tends to maximize the outcome: 
higher private effort and low failure rate. 
Previous experience in the PIIS procedure increases by 19.8% the 
probability of having an application approved. These findings could be 
linked with “pick the winner” principle, in which experience in subsidies is a 
sign of firm best performance and successful project (see e. g. Aerts and 
Thorwarth, 2008; Aschhoff, 2009; Hud and Hussinger, 2015). Nevertheless, in 
our model this conclusion is not necessarily good news. On one hand, this 
could reveal that the public incentive goes more to the same companies, and 
that firms could receive more than one subvention under the PIIS. Or it could 
reveal that firms familiar with the application process could easier have 
access to public support because they know in which factors to put emphasis 
in the application form. 
Company size, measured by the number of employees, seems not to influence 
the probability of having an application approved, contrary to the literature, 
but these results could be a limitation of the study, due to size and 
characteristics of the sample. Indeed, the sample is mainly composed of micro 
and small companies, and the average number of employees in both groups 
(approved and not approved applications) is almost the same and around 5 
workers. 
The activity sector of the investment project also matters, particularly if it is 
in the industry, tourism and services sector. Compared to other sectors 
(reference category), applications in these areas have a higher probability of 
being approved, possibly because the regional policy, namely the Research 
and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialization (RIS3) for the Alentejo 
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region, is more focused on developing innovation in these sectors, due to 
regional specialization, namely in agri-business and tourism activities. Then 
again, services, namely specialized services, are a sector with high added 
value and growth potential that are now included in the RIS3 for Alentejo. 
The model shows that when firms have a higher cost of financing their project 
in the financial market, represented by the Euribor, the probability of having 
an application approved increases. This conclusion could illustrate the 
mechanism of public support in trying to reduce the cost of innovation and in 
counteracting the financial market’s failings. 
In periods of economic growth the probability of getting a subsidy increases, 
which could mean that the public instrument is not effective in the period 
when it approves projects, because an inverse relationship should be the 
case. In periods of economic crisis, the aim of the public instrument is to 
improve conditions for launching more projects in the regions. 
TABLE 1. IMPACT ON GETTING PUBLIC SUPPORT TO INNOVATION: MAIN FINDINGS 
POSITIVE IMPACT NEGATIVE IMPACT NON-SIGNIFICANT 
Amount of investment 
Experience in 
application procedure 
Export intensity 
Increase of skilled job 
and patent stock 
Macroeconomic 
environment (Euribor 
and GDP variation) 
Increase of productivity Determinants of credit 
bank decision and risk 
Experience in R&D 
activity 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Portuguese Innovation Incentive System was an important instrument of 
the Portuguese National Strategic Reference Framework 2007 – 2013, 
developed with the aim of stimulating innovation and promoting 
competitiveness. Between 2007 and 2013, 451 applications to PIIS were 
submitted under the Alentejo Regional Operational Program. The approval 
rate was 48%. Entities in charge of evaluating applications showed on 
average an effective selection process, particularly when the incentive is 
supposed to counteract financial market failings. Indeed, an interesting 
finding was that when firms have a higher expected cost of financing 
investment, the public policy instrument seems to provide additional financial 
support to innovative firms, in order to be more competitive. On the other 
hand, firm characteristics influencing credit risk such as size, profitability and 
solvency ratio are not relevant factors for being selected for R&D subsidies. 
However, government evaluators are also cautious selecting projects with a 
low potential failure risk in order to maximize the expected outcome for 
society, namely in terms of jobs creation. 
Nevertheless, government preference for promoting employment is shown 
to be higher than the impact on firm productivity, which in the long-run 
could mean firm inefficiency. So, if productivity leads to competitiveness and 
this to economic growth, the long-run inefficiency of subsidized-firms could 
affect the effectiveness and sustainability of public policies. 
The Portuguese Innovation Incentive System seems to be more focused on 
short-term results, such as increasing the number of jobs and intensifying the 
external commercial relationship, than on the long-term economic 
sustainability of the outcome.  
Our personal recommendation move beyond short-term increase of 
employment in favour of support for more sustainable creation of jobs by 
firms. Indeed, if the problem is about sustainability and firm efficiency 
(output per employee), the solution could be to exclude the increase of jobs 
number as main determinant in the selection process. Past and current 
performance of firm should be also include in the selection process, because a 
better investment project are not necessarily linked to better 
entrepreneurship, namely if the application form is filled by an external 
consultant. It is also important that government evaluator assesses the 
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feasibility of project return, taking into account both the trend in the 
(national and international) markets and the entrepreneur profile (capacity to 
achieve planned targets). 
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APPENDIX 1. BINARY CHOICE MODEL 
Pr(Approved application =1β…) = G[ş0 + ş1job_pre + ş2industry + 
ş3tourism + ş4services + ş5trade + ş6subtmit_before + 
ş7ln_investment + ş8rd_pre + ş9var_patent + 
ş10var_patent2 + ş11solvability_pre + ş12roe_pre + 
ş13exp_intensity + ş14var_productivity + ş15var_skill_job + 
ş16var_skill_job2 + ş17ln_euribor + ş18reg_gdp_var]   
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APPENDIX 2. RESULTS OF MODEL ESTIMATION 
TABLE 2. RESULTS OF BINARY CHOICE MODEL 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENTS (STD. ERR) MARGINAL EFFECTS 
Job_pre -0.00617 (0.00832) -0.002   
Industry 1.720*** (0.610) 0.487 *** 
Tourism 1.180* (0.609) 0.334 * 
Services 1.590*** (0.612) 0.450 *** 
Trade 1.007 (0.745) 0.285   
Submit_before 0.701*** (0.203) 0.198 *** 
Ln_investment 0.126* (0.0652) 0.036 * 
Rd_pre_yes 0.388 (0.351) 0.110   
Var_patent 0.334** (0.154) 0.094 ** 
Var_patent2 -0.0351** (0.0171) -0.010 ** 
Solvability_pre -0.00157 (0.00210) 0.000   
Roe_pre 0.346 (0.214) 0.098   
Exp_intensity 0.993*** (0.269) 0.281 *** 
Var_productivity -0.00141** (0.000580) 0.000 ** 
Var_skill_job 0.0671*** (0.0182) 0.019 *** 
Var_skilljob2 -0.000674*** (0.000229) 0.000 *** 
Ln_euribor 0.285** (0.115) 0.081 ** 
Reg_gdp_var 4.573** (2.090) 1.294 ** 
Constant -2.992** (1.205)     
Observations 434      
Log likelihood function -253.22751      
Reset Test (Wald) 0.6306    
Reset Test (LR) 0.6347    
% Correctly Classified 71.20%    
Source: Authors’ own elaboration with STATA output. 
Comments: Results of Cloglog Model. 
Legend: *** coefficient significant at 1%, ** coefficient significant at 5% and * coefficient 
significant at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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